Overcoming the Clash of Civilizations: EU Peace Strategies for Balkan Ethno-Sectarian Nationalist Conflicts by DeDominicis, Benedict E.
1
Overcoming the Clash of Civilizations: EU Peace Strategies for 
Balkan Ethno-Sectarian Nationalist Conflicts
Benedict E. DeDominicis, PhD
The American University in Bulgaria and Wright State University – Lake Campus
Introduction
This study focuses on trends in relationships between Serb and Bulgarian ethno-sectarian 
majorities and their respective, Muslim minorities within a dynamic international systemic 
context.  It does not focus on the Kosovar and ethnic Albanian national minority case more 
broadly throughout the Balkans, partly because Kosovo has already achieved de facto and will 
soon achieve de jure separation from Serbia, and partly because of space limitations.  More 
attention is on the Bulgarian case as an example of relatively successful conflict resolution.  For 
comparison purposes, the Serbian case is the Sandzak, a historic region straddling Serbia and 
Montenegro which is home to a concentration of Slavophone Muslims.  Serbian nationalism 
meanwhile continues to suffer setbacks along with the post Cold War decline of intensity of 
Great Power willingness to support it as an ally in Southeastern Europe.  After the separation of 
Montenegro from the confederation of Serbia and Montenegro, and the imminent separation 
secession of Kosovo, the Sandzak region, along with the Presovo valley with its ethnic Albanian 
population, is most likely to be one within Serbia, together with Voivodina, to witness more 
demands for autonomy, if not outright secession to join Bosnia.  Whereas Voivodina’s largest 
ethnic minority consists of Hungarians, the Muslims of the historic region of Sandzak (part of 
which lies in now-independent Montenegro) has an ethno-sectarian concentration of “Bosniaks.”  
They tend to self-identify with the neighboring Bosniaks with their capital in Sarajevo in Bosnia-
Herzegovina to the point that their preferred name is “Bosniak.”
1
The fact that continuing international military intervention is the primary mechanism by 
which to prevent most if not all of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina from falling under the 
control of Belgrade and Zagreb serves as a tempering factor against a strengthening of Bosniak 
nationalism in the Sandzak.  Indeed, a comparatively weak capability to establish a sovereign 
Bosniak state relative to greater Croat and Serb nationalist aspirations has been an inhibiting 
factor in the development and expression of Bosniak nationalism overall.  Consequently, in the 
early 1990s, Bosniak strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina emphasized attracting international 
intervention to create a political environment to avoid submission to Serb or Croat sovereignty.  
Bosniak self-expression lacks the requisite capability due partly to Bosniak dispersed regional 
demographic distribution to allow for genuine Bosniak sovereignty.  The Bosniak primary 
intensity identity community therefore must remain dependent and ultimately subservient to the 
jurisdiction of the state agents of the international community in order not to fall under Croat or 
Serb control.  Cottam and Cottam therefore describe Bosniak identity politics in the case of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina as seeking subnational self-expression.
2  This subnational self-
expression movement arguably continues among the Bosniaks of Serbia’s Sandzak.  One would 
therefore expect that in Serbia proper, the Sandzak Bosniaks who identify at a primary intensity 
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level with the Slavophone Serb Muslim community will continue a similar strategy of seeking 
international protection from Serb nationalism.  Meanwhile, the Montenegran Bosniaks in the 
part of historic Sandzak in Montenegro arguably have little to fear from the prospect of 
Montenegran nationalism.  Montenegran self-determination is itself dependent on maintaining 
benign relations with NATO member great powers to gain the prosperity benefits of EU 
integration for a state with a total population of approximately 700,000.  Along with the relative 
absence of perception of threat, Bosniaks of Montenegran Sandzak also can look forward to the 
social mobility and social creativity options available through Euro-Atlantic economic and 
political integration of a stable Montenegro.
The US and its allies had been following a relatively low cost (for NATO) stabilization 
strategy with regard to the states of the former Yugoslavia, focusing on stabilizing these new 
independent states within their existing, Tito-era republic boundaries.
3  Conveniently, European 
Union integration would arguably be a plausible high-level tactical component for such a 
stabilization strategy.  The international community has lacked the intensity of commitment 
necessary to confront the difficult task of addressing and reconciling the overlapping and 
conflicting national self-determination demands of the Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats and ethnic 
Albanians before the outbreak of warfare.  As the escalating mass violence itself generates 
broader international political crises, then the international community has accommodated these 
demands, initially on the basis of particular historical relationships, i.e. Austria, German and 
Italian sympathy for Slovene and Croat national self-determination vis-a-vis Belgrade.
4  As 
NATO turned against Milosievic’s Serbia, Kosovar nationalism gained the consequent political 
benefits of being another, eventually NATO-allied adversary of Milosievic.  Hence, subsequent 
developments have led to the present situation in which Kosovo with the support of the 
international community will become independent.  Meanwhile, Serb irredentist demands for 
unification with Serbs outside of the boundaries of the Republic of Serbia, which are a legacy of 
the Titoist regime, remain anathema according to the international community vis-à-vis Bosnia, 
for example.  This impasse for Serb nationalism will continue at least until Serbia succeeds in 
generating more influence among the most influential Contact Group members (Russia, US, UK, 
Germany, France, Italy).  Russian President Vladimir Putin has made assertive statements 
against the secession of Kosovo, arguing that it will set a precedent for international resolution of 
other secessionist disputes, such as in Cyprus and in Georgia.
5  Yet, Russia in 2003 withdrew all 
of its forces from the Balkans with the exception of Moldova.
6  In fact, Russia (and China) has at 
times indicated that it will acquiesce to the separation of Kosovo from Serbia, albeit it expects an 
appropriate trade-off for accepting this outcome.
7
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The lack of coherent administrative borders for historic, ethnically-concentrated regions 
as well as restrictions on electoral democracy have been significant factors in explaining why 
Bulgarian Turkish nationalism and Bosniak nationalism among the Sandzak Muslims have not 
been a primary intensity communal political motivation for these two “minority” groups.  
Evidently with the aim of preventing or weakening any Sandzak national identity claims, the 
Yugoslav authorities divided historic Sandzak among Montenegro and Serbia.  The Serb 
authorities have further gerrymandered and weakened Sandzak Bosniak political influence by 
allocating its part of Sandzak’s municipalities among administrative regional “okruzi” with 
illogical geographic borders in order to dilute Boszniak political influence in policy making.
8  In 
the case of the Bulgarian Turks, the Bulgarian central government has refused to allow 
administrative gubernatorial districts to select governors through direct elections.  As in the 
Sandzak, local electoral mechanisms do determine Bulgarian mayors and city council 
composition.  The Bulgarian authorities have refrained from accepting proposals from the 
Council of Europe recommending the direct election of the regional council for each of the 28 
districts into which constitutional reforms divided Bulgaria in 1995.  The current law on local 
self-government has the central government appoint the governor for each of these 28 districts.  
Since 1999, this governor then chairs a regional development council consisting of the elected 
mayor of each municipal district plus one municipal assembly member.
9
The Post Milosievic International Systemic Context: Euro-Atlantic Integration
Balkan nationalisms continue to be a challenge to current trends in the development of 
the ESDP as part of a peace strategy in the light of the perceived international community failure 
to prevent the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia.  Recognizing national self-determination as a 
human right for communities aspiring for national sovereignty should be part of the formulation 
of a peace strategy for Europe and elsewhere.  One highlight of the June 2001 Gothenburg 
European Council (in the midst of successful international intervention to prevent full-scale civil 
war in Macedonia) was the formal approval of the “EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent 
Conflicts,” with its focus on preventive diplomacy including the integration of civilian and 
military functions under the evolving European Security and Defence Policy.  Conflict 
prevention was a prominent theme in the formal statements of European Council conclusions, as 
well as in the proposals at the later EU Constitutional Convention.  Implementation of the “rule 
of law” in conflict-vulnerable areas is part of the mantra of the prerequisites for conflict 
prevention, next to prevention of human rights abuses.  The June 2001 Gotheburg European 
Council’s “EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts” elaborated on the SF/HR’s 
report for the December 2000 Nice Council, emphasizing that conflict prevention is an essential 
part of the ESDP:
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3. Conflict prevention calls for a co-operative approach to facilitate peaceful 
solutions to disputes and implies addressing the root-causes of conflicts. It is an 
important element of all aspects of the external relations of the European Union. 
The development of ESDP has, since the outset, been intended to strengthen the 
EU's capacity for action in the crucial field of conflict prevention.
10
The “EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts” is a peace strategy through a 
diplomacy of human rights (broadly understood):  
The international community has a political and moral responsibility to act to 
avoid the human suffering and the destruction of resources caused by violent 
conflicts. The European Union is a successful example of conflict prevention, 
based on democratic values and respect for human rights, justice and solidarity, 
economic prosperity and sustainable development. The process of enlargement 
will extend this community of peace and progress to a wider circle of European 
states.
11
The Swedish Presidency’s report to the Gothenburg European Council on the ESDP emphasizes 
imposition of the “rule of law” to prevent violent conflict through human rights support:  
I. RULE OF LAW
2. The EU attaches great importance to the strengthening of the rule of law 
as a tool for both conflict prevention and crisis management. Experience shows 
that strengthening the rule of law is a pre-condition for consolidation of peace and 
security. International efforts to strengthen, and where necessary re-establish, 
credible local police forces cannot be fully successful if the police are not 
complemented by a functioning judicial and penal system.
12
Despite the comparative success in avoiding violent ethnic conflict since 1990 in 
Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Turks also have a range of grievances stemming from historical, 
systematic marginalization including the critical absence of their high-or mid-level 
representation in the Bulgarian military, internal security and diplomatic service.  
Strengthening overall EU capabilities includes a focus on building a judicial and 
enforcement capacity:  
6. […] In such a situation, the re-establishment of local judicial and penal systems 
should be initiated as soon as possible. While rule of law missions would usually 
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be deployed as a complement to a police component, they could also be 
undertaken without such a component. In any given mission, rapid build-up of 
local capacity and subsequent hand-over to local ownership is essential.
13
The authority of the state will have legitimacy, i.e. “local ownership,” to the extent to which a 
peace strategy is successful in promoting a prevailing view among the different ethno-sectarian 
groups within the territorial community of the state that the authorities are representative of and 
accountable to their respective communal identity values.  From the perspective of the broader 
international system in the form of the United Nations, in order to create this “culture of peace,” 
the source of it in political perceptions and their relationship to attitudes and values requires 
explication.
14  The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization has taken 
up the issue of formulating the content of promoting a “culture of peace” from the perspective of 
international law within the UN system.
15  From a political psychological perspective, a critical 
prerequisite for the establishment of a “culture of peace,” at a societal level requires the 
establishment of a primary allegiance with the territorial community whose boundaries 
correspond with the boundaries of the state.  A mismatch between primary ethnic and religious 
identities and existing territorial boundaries has been a primary context for the emergence of 
violent nationalist conflict in the Balkans and elsewhere.  Indeed, promotion of this “good” form 
of territorial status quo nationalism so that the typical citizen perceived all ethnic groups as a 
legitimate part of the citizenry of the state is a theme in much of the policy analysis literature 
focusing on the peaceful resolution of conflict in the Balkans.
16  The model typically is the ideal-
typical American one; America from this perspective provides examples of inclusive, good, 
“civic” nationalism which uses liberal political and economic values to overcome ethnic, racial, 
and religious divisions to incorporate all groups as loyal citizens.
17  Indeed, ideally, in the 
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context of Euro-Atlantic integration, the leadership of the different ethnic groups within the state 
increasingly should seek political legitimation via their respective constituencies through 
recognition and confirmation of the policies of each other while striving cooperatively to 
implement regionally European Union standards.
18  Nevertheless, with the continuing 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, clearly, the identification of the state as representing the ethnic 
cultural majority community and minorities as, at best, guests indicates that ethno-sectarian 
identifications remain paramount.  Promotion of a primary intensity attachment with their 
respective state territorial communities among the different ethnic groups comprising the 
“national” political communities of the Balkans remains a challenge.  It will likely not succeed in 
some, just as it did not succeed despite 40 years of policy efforts to do so in Tito’s Yugoslavia.  
It also failed after 70 years of brutal Communist assimilation policy in the USSR as well.
The EU obviously plays an important role in post-Milosievic efforts to engage in state 
building in Southeast Europe.
19  It thereby serves to reinforce the stabilization approach of the 
international community to the peoples of the former Yugoslavia.  The prospect of the relative 
individual and group opportunities for utilitarian gain from European integration are an 
influential factor motivating actors in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who would rather not cooperate, to 
do so.
20  The current unwillingness of Belgrade and Zagreb actively to encourage their Bosnian
ethno-sectarian compatriots to aspire towards unification with their respective patron states is 
certainly a critical factor motivating this cooperation.  Similarly, this same combination of 
positive and negative incentives from the international community will also encourage the 
Bosniaks of Sandzak to cooperate with Belgrade to achieve progress towards European Union 
integration to the extent that it appears feasible.  According to a scenario of renewed violent 
conflict regarding the separation of Kosovo and the unification of Republika Srpska with Serbia, 
and European Union integration no longer appearing feasible, then an upsurge in the nationalist 
components of Sandzak Bosnian identity should be more likely, i.e. an increase in pan-Islamic 
appeals.
21  Parallels here might be found in the intensely violent conflict in Chechnya, with 
Chechen nationalism having acquired an Islamist element, partly as a consequence of a Chechen 
search for support to counteract the Russian comparative power advantage.
22     
                                                                                                                                                            
leadership to choose an integrationist path is a critical factor for the lack of violent ethnic 
communal conflict in Bulgaria, although it does state that structural factors may also play a part 
(pp. 2, 11, 12, 19).
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21 Serb nationalism is apparently becoming more salient in the Serb policy making process along 
with the continuing challenges to Serb nationalism in the form of the loss of Montenegro and the 
impending separation of Kosovo.  See for example Daniel Dombey and Neil MacDonald, 
“Tensions with Serbs raise fears over links with EU,” Financial Times, 19.6.06 at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/b6a42060-ff2f-11da-84f3-0000779e2340.html on 26.6.06.
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Balkan State-Level Context In a Dynamic International Environment 
The cyclical history of violent abuse of the Turkish and Muslim minority in Bulgaria is 
well-documented.  Consequently, from the perspective of nationalism in relation to conflict, the 
analyst confronts a mystery: Bulgaria should not be as peaceful has it has been since 1989.  
Stereotypical portrayals of Muslim minorities as prone to militant Islamist influence in the post 
11 September 2001 international systemic environment should be in evidence in the media.  
Moreover, the lack of strong Bulgarian nationalist assimilationist or expulsive policies towards 
the Turkish and Muslim minority is surprising.  Reciprocally, more evidence at least for 
Bulgarian Turkish nationalist mass behavior should also be present in Bulgaria.  Yet, using the 
search function on the 3-year database at FT.com which includes BBC monitoring service 
reports, with the keywords “Bulgaria” and “Wahhabi,” only one article emerged from the BBC 
monitoring service.  This 2004 article was rather one from Serbia, claiming among other things, 
that two al-Qaeda operatives had set up a cell in Plovdiv, Bulgaria.  Nothing emerged from the 
BBC monitoring service’s coverage of the Bulgarian media.  Western media note that Bulgarian 
media regularly claims a rise Salafist/Wahhabi education activity in Bulgaria but these reports 
appear to be sensationalist or reflect leadership faction power struggles.  Claims of a significant 
popular following in Bulgaria do not have corroboration from Western or Bulgarian security 
services or external independent observers.
23
In the Balkans, Muslim minorities have undergone the political awareness change process 
within the context of ethnic nation state formation, albeit with the cultural community including 
sectarian community boundaries as a component.
24  As predominates in Southeastern Europe, 
“Muslim” or “Turk” has therefore come to define an ethno-sectarian minority.  Most [but not all, 
e.g. the Roma (Gypsies)] of the comparatively large minorities have an ethnic motherland/nation 
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part of standard journalistic reporting: Neil Buckley, “Russian troops kill Chechen rebel leader,” 
Financial Times, 19.6.06, at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/4d86352c-ff30-11da-84f3-0000779e2340.html on 26.6.06.  BBC 
Monitoring Service, “Rebel Chechen minister argues against democracy,”  BBC Monitoring 
Service - United Kingdom; Jan 31, 2006, Source: Kavkaz-Tsentr news agency website, in 
Russian 8 Jan 06 at http://search.ft.com/search/article.html on 1 February 2006.
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state to which they look for political support.
25  The same holds true for Bulgarian Turks; a 
consensus apparently exists within the academic community that the prevailing view among 
Bulgarian Turks historically and presently includes an intense self-identification with Turkey as 
the motherland state.
26  This identification with a regional patron state has not historically 
prevented intercommunal violence which has approached genocidal levels at times.
27  It does, 
however, create a local political context which has not initially been favorable for pan-Islamism 
among ethnic minorities instead of pan-Turanism.  On the other hand, to the extent that ethnic 
secular elites among Muslim minorities fail to deliver on these community self-expression 
demands, allowing the dysfunctional and intolerable political limbo to continue in places like 
Kosovo and the Sandzak, then pan-Islamism may become more attractive as a means by which to 
draw upon transnational resources to mobilize the leverage necessary to change the status quo.
28
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Kosovo,” 20 November 2005, http://search.ft.com/search/articles.html on 29 January 2006, Text 
of commentary by Islamic theologian Zekeria Idrizi: "Careful: 'Wahhabists' marching in 
Albanian lands", published by Kosovo Albanian newspaper Koha Ditore on 15 November 2005.  
The International Crisis Group claims that charges of “Wahhabism” emerged in Macedonia due 
to “generational” disputes over control over financial resources and mosque administrations 
within the Islamic Association of Macedonia, the governing body of Macedonian Muslims there, 
but no “threat” to Macedonia from “radical Islam” exists at present because the disputants do not 
articulate differentiating theologies/ideologies [International Crisis Group, “Macedonia: 9
In the mass politics era, instances of intense ethno-sectarian conflict had occurred in 
Bulgaria beginning in the nineteenth century.  Bulgarian Turks had Turkey as a “mother 
country” with which to identify, and refugees fled there, rather than to other parts of Bulgaria.  In 
Bosnia, the intermixture of groups, together with the fact that Bosnian Muslims were Slavic 
whose identification with Turkey was historical (the Ottoman Empire), rather than current, meant 
that this conflict mitigation valve of escape to the national mother country was not as readily an 
option; the Bosnian Muslims had no other home other than their own country.  
Unlike in the past, the ethnic Bulgarian majority today comparatively tends not to view 
the Turks of Bulgaria as an intense challenge to Bulgarian national values, including national 
irredentist unity, or at least not anywhere near as intensely as the Serbs viewed Croats and 
Muslims as a challenge.  Internal republic boundaries becoming international boundaries has not 
been a perceived challenge which Bulgaria faces in relation to its own national interests and 
aspirations.  Those aspirations, to the extent that they exist, still focus on Macedonia if they 
focus anywhere.  In this sense, then, Bulgaria is more likely to have a complex view of Greater 
Albanian aspirations since many view it as a challenge to the integrity of Macedonia.  At the 
same time, Bulgarians worry about the “demonstration effect” of Kosovo secession on 
Bulgaria’s Turks, but as long as Ankara does not encourage or support Turkish secessionist 
aspirations, then the Bulgarian Turks cannot have any hope of succeeding in any such 
aspirations.  In this sense, then, Bulgarian Turkish identity self-expression is likely to be in the 
subnational category.  A combination of shared sovereignty and utilitarian integration strategies 
are therefore more likely to be successful in integrating the Turks resident in the state of Bulgaria 
into a political community whose evolution is likely to be in the direction of creation a new 
culture. 
29  In other words, for the state of Bulgaria sustainably to develop, the core community 
culture for it should evolve to create a third, amalgamated culture.  Meanwhile, while not seeking 
political autonomy, Bulgarian Turk self-expression occurs within the framework of a utilitarian 
integration strategy within an EU-focused Bulgaria, with the de facto Bulgarian Turkish 
“Movement for Rights and Freedoms” (MRF) providing political party representation to the 
Bulgarian Turks.
30
The negative and romantic stereotype components of Bulgaria self-identity have the 
Turks and their religion as the essential “other.”  It has become the “other” ethno-sectarian group 
against which Bulgarian national identity community struggled politically and at great cost to 
gain national self-determination.  Many decades of national education policy and historiography 
have propagated the theme of the 500-year “Ottoman Yoke.”  Meanwhile, historically it has 
accompanied  periodic violent efforts at expulsion or assimilation which have reinforced this 
negative image.
31  This stereotypical national identification of self in opposition to the political 
power of the Turks has been part of the early familial and formal educational socialization 
process producing generations of Bulgarian citizens.  At the same time, centuries of cohabitation 
on the Balkan peninsula have also produced interpersonal cultural features which promote 
                                                                                                                                                            
Wobbling toward Europe,” Europe Briefing N°41, Skopje/Brussels, 12 January 2006, pp. 1, 10, 
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peaceful coexistence.  These statements apply not only to ethnic groups on Bulgarian territory, 
but throughout the Balkans.
32
In years past, international attention had been turned to Bulgaria as a possible scene for 
violent communal conflict due to the most recent episode of state-sanctioned ethnic cleansing in 
the 1980s, beginning in 1986 and ending with the collapse of the Communist regime in 1989.  
USSR Communist Party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev launched “perestroika” 
[restructuring] and eventually ended the USSR’s vast economic subsidies to its client regimes in 
Eastern Europe.  Predominantly in the form of cheap fossil fuel supplies, the end of these 
subsidies intensified greatly the economic and political crises of the Brezhnev “stagnation” 
period throughout Warsaw Pact states and helped set the stage for their eventual collapse.  
An appreciation of Bulgaria’s very close association with the USSR hegemon even by 
Warsaw Treaty Organization standards is essential.
33 It is critical to understanding Bulgarian 
political behavior during the Communist period, and therefore after the Communist period as 
well.  Bulgaria’s reputation as the closest ally of the USSR is one which appears to have a 
general consensus as being true.  It is also one which the Soviet leadership, and later the Russian 
leadership, also viewed as true.
34  The Bulgarian Communist authorities transfered most closely 
and most enthusiastically to Bulgaria the public policy initiatives of the Soviet regime.  With 
regard to minority policies, the Bulgarian Marxist-Leninist regime justified forced assimilation 
of minorities as a stage in the creation of worldwide proletariat.  It would make the Bulgarian 
Turks (and the other minorities as well) into the next-stage, Bulgarian proto-version of the future, 
universal New Socialist Man.  In reality, as Maria Koinova notes, “Communist nationalism” 
came to replace “Communist internationalism” following the death of Stalin in 1953 and 
                                                
32 See Antonina Zhelyazkova et al, Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between 
Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria (Sofia: International Centre for Minority Studies and 
Intercultural Relations Foundation, 1994), e.g. p. XV and Prof. Vera Mutafchieva, “The Turk, 
the Jew and the Gypsy,” (in same), p. 23. 
33 For a 1995 polemic during the Socialist (post-Communist) Zhan Videnov government, 
lamenting the Bulgarian intelligentsia’s weak sense of national identity as the Videnov 
government’s unwillingness to apply to join NATO illustrated, see Prof. Dr. Georgi Fotev,  
“Bulgaria and The European Humanity,” Democratsia, p. 9.  Democratsia was the UDF party 
paper, and Fotev is a prestigious sociologist who is also a member of the Board of Trustees of 
the American University in Bulgaria.
34 See, for example, media reports over Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s public comment that 
Bulgaria may be a potential candidate to join a new, post-Soviet “quadrilateral community” 
integration agreement between Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Belarus.  The Bulgarian 
President and UDF leader Zhelu Zhelev and the Socialist Party government of Zhan Videnov 
formally rejected Boris Yeltsin’s public invitation and protested against his presumption, while 
demonstrations occurred in Sofia against Yeltsin’s comment: Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, 8 
April 1996, “Bulgaria Will Present a Note to Russia on President Yeltsin’s Statement,” at
http://www.b-info.com/places/Bulgaria/news/96-04/apr08.bta on 1.6.06; 9 April 1996, 
“Bulgarian Ambassador in Russia Delivers Verbal Note,” at http://www.b-
info.com/places/Bulgaria/news/96-04/apr09.bta on 1.6.06 and OMRI Daily Digest, No. 70, 9 
April 1996, “Southeastern Europe: Bulgarian Political Roundup,” at www.b-
info.com/places/Bulgaria/news/96-04/apr09.omri on 1.6.06. 11
Khrushchev’s denunciation of him in 1956.
35  These minorities were under pressure to become 
socialist Bulgarian citizens.
Soviet perestroika was a blow to the economic element of the Bulgarian Communist 
authorities’ domestic control strategy.  In the late 1980s, they attempted to compensate vainly but 
brutally by appealing to Bulgarian nationalism.  The Bulgarian Communist authorities 
manipulated again the historiographic theme of the “Ottoman Yoke.”  Specifically, they claimed 
to rectify the crime of the Muslim Turks forcing themselves and their religion on the once-great 
late medieval Orthodox Bulgarian people. The Bulgarian communist government’s 
“vizrozditelen” (regeneration) process aimed to force the Bulgarian Turkish minority in the 
country to change their names to their Bulgarian Orthodox corresponding forms.  They used lists 
of names which the Bulgarian Communist-state experts sanctioned.  The claim was that the 
Turks of Bulgaria were basically genetically Bulgarian but they had assimilated into the Turkish 
culture and religion due to Ottoman imperialism.  They had forgotten that they were Bulgarians 
during a “Turkification” process involving 500 years of Ottoman domination, beginning with 
their conversion to Islam.
36 The Communist authorities’ claim to represent the Bulgarian ethno-
sectarian national community reflected a tendency throughout the Balkans in the late 1980s.  The 
“regeneration” process would rectify this supposed Ottoman crime against these Bulgarian 
families whom Ottoman imperialism had torn from the bosom of their Bulgarian ethno-sectarian 
national community.  It would return the members of this stereotypically distrusted and despised 
Ottoman-legacy minority to its progressive, communist-era core community.
37  It would also 
defend the Bulgarian nation more broadly against the possibility of Turkish irredentism.  The 
Bulgarian authorities as the closest ideological ally of the Soviet Union sought to hasten the 
                                                
35 Maria Koinova, “Minorities in Southeast Europe: Muslims of Bulgaria,” Center for 
Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe - Southeast Europe (CEDIME-SE), 
December 1999 (21.05.06 at www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/ CEDIME-Reports-
Minorities-in-Bulgaria.html, p. 10.
36 Volin Siderov, leader of the xenophobic, “Attack” party which received 8.5% of the votes in 
2005 national parliamentary elections, regularly declares his opposition to the policies of the 
authorities whom he claims serve the “Gypsification” and “Turkification” of Bulgaria through 
unacceptable accommodation of these minorities in what should be the state of the Bulgarian 
ethnos.  Siderov charges the European Union and the US as imposing these policies on Bulgaria 
as part of their effort to control and solidify Bulgaria’s separation from Russia, the traditional 
ally and Great Power liberator of Bulgaria from the Ottomans in 1878, in order to exploit 
Bulgaria politically and economically (Miglena Kichukova, “The Leader of the Attack Party,” 
unpublished senior thesis paper, American University in Bulgaria, May 2006). 
37 At approximately the same time, the Kurdish Workers’ Party started its armed resistance 
against the Turkish regime leading to violence that led to approximately 36,000 deaths and the 
destruction of thousands of Kurdish villages in southeast Turkey.  The Turkish authorities until 
this time had also denied that the Kurds were a minority, describing them as “mountain Turks” 
who had lost their Turkish identity through geographic isolation from their cosmopolitan 
brethren in western Turkey.  Note that comparable justifications emerged for genocidal-
assimilationist policies had been adopted at various points in Yugoslavia during World War II 
against the Bosnian Muslims, with both Croat and Serb authorities proclaiming that the Bosniaks 
were Serbs or Croats who had converted to Islam during the Ottoman period and by Greeks 
against Macedonians (Mutafchieva, esp. p. 37).12
eventual disappearance of ethnicity as a legacy of bourgeois false consciousness.  The 
Gorbachev regime soon aborted this Soviet approach to ethnicity and nationality with its 
assumption of their eventual withering away.  The Bulgarian Communist authorities desperately 
continued to pursue it to compensate for the danger of political instability due to economic 
decline.
38  Estimates are that between 500 to 1,500 people died in the violent clashes between 
resistors and police forces which had surrounded Turkish villages and forced their inhabitants to 
sign legal documents changing their names.
39  Failure to obey would result minimally in 
institutional coercion such as an inability to access bank accounts, draw pensions, and register 
marriages.  Thousands of Bulgarian Turks were arrested and sent to labor camps for resisting 
prior to 1989.
The liberalizing European regional context and cut-off of Soviet subsidies and support for 
their Communist client regimes hastened the bourgeoning national economic and political crises 
in the Warsaw Pact member states.  As both internal turmoil and international protests grew, 
towards the end of the 1980s, Bulgarian Communist leader Todor Zhivkov decided to allow 
Bulgarian Turks to leave the country.  350,000 people out of a total population of 9 million then 
fled or were expelled to Turkey in 1989.  It was as an accommodation to the growing economic, 
social and political crises which the forced name change policy was causing, leaving behind their 
expropriated property, as well family members.
40  To legitimate the policy in the European 
context of the rapidly disintegrating Cold War, the Bulgarian Communist leadership decided in 
1989 to give Bulgarian passports with exit visas to the Bulgarian Turks.  The so-called “Grand 
Excursion” lead to hundreds of thousands leaving Bulgaria, as well as contributing to the 
collapse of the regime itself.
41
                                                
38 See The Bulgarian Ethnic Experience, p. 8 as well as Vera Mutafchieva (Ibid.) and Gerald W. 
Creed, “The Bases of Bulgaria’s Ethnic Policies,” The Anthropology of East Europe Review: 
Newsletter of the East European Anthropology Group, vol. 9, no. 2, Fall 1990, at 
http://condor.depaul.edu/~rrotenbe/aeer/aeer9_2.html 19.6.06.
Some Bulgarian elites claim that the Bulgarian Communist Party launched the “regeneration” 
process without Moscow’s approval while the extended transition from Brezhnev to Andropov to 
Chernenko and finally to Gorbachev diverted Soviet attention from the BCP’s own initiative, 
extending a parallel policy of repeatedly and forcibly changing the names of another Bulgarian 
minority, the Pomaks, who are Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, during 1912-1982.  
39 Mongabay.com, “Bulgaria—Society,” at 
http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/bulgaria/SOCIETY.html on 19.6.06.
40 Peter Stamatov, “The Making of a “Bad” Public: Ethnonational Mobilization in Post-
Communist Bulgaria,” p. 10, at 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW1/GSW1/12%20Stamatov.pdf on 20.6.06.  In a 
footnote citing other scholarship, Stamatov notes that the 1989 exodus was the latest in a cycle 
push-pull migration of Bulgarian Turks out of Bulgaria: “The stream of Turks emigrating to 
Turkey has never ceased since the creation of the modern Bulgarian state.”
41 Ali Eminov, “Nationality Policy in the USSR and in Bulgaria: Some Observations,” The 
Anthropology of East Europe Review: Newsletter of the East European Anthropology Group, 
vol. 9, no. 2, Fall 1990, at http://condor.depaul.edu/~rrotenbe/aeer/aeer9_2.html 19.6.06.  
Observers note that the departure of hundreds of thousands of people from agricultural areas 
depleted the labor force and contributed to the growing macroeconomic crisis, even while, as 
with previous forced migrations, allowing the expropriation and confiscation of large amounts of 13
The Turkish government, claiming it was unable to cope with the refugee flow, noted that 
demonstrations were occurring in Turkey demanding military intervention to protect the 
Bulgarian Turks.  Yet, military intervention was never seriously contemplated.
42  With the end of 
the Communist regime, one of the first acts of the Bulgarian authorities was to revoke the forced 
name change, despite demonstrations among some Bulgarian population centers opposing the 
reversal of the policy.
43  Some 100,000-150,000 of this 350,000 returned to Bulgaria in 1989-90 
(detailed records for this time are sketchy).  In 1994, those remaining in Turkey acquired the 
right to maintain or regain their Bulgarian citizenship together with their Turkish citizenship, and 
they have the right to vote in Bulgarian elections.
44  The Bulgarian media covers the regular 
visits of Bulgarian national political figures to the city of Bursa in Turkey to court this Bulgarian 
Turkish diaspora vote.
In the 1980s, a number of terrorist attacks occurred in response to the forced assimilation 
policy, including detonation of bombs in public spaces.
45  Bulgarian Turkish leaders such as 
Ahmed Dogan would spend time in jail due to their resistance.  Dogan, a former university 
professor of philosophy, would emerge in 1990 to form the “Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms,” a de facto ethnic Turkish party.  The more militant Adem Kenan emerged within 
Dogan’s organization.  Kenan would later politically marginalize himself by advocating national 
minority recognition and federal status for the Turkish minority.
46  Dogan would follow a more 
utilitarian strategy for integration of the Turkish minority in the democratic Bulgarian state while 
maintaining his own leadership of this community.
This violent episode occurring at the end of the Zhivkov regime, however, was the latest 
in a periodic cycle of violent conflicts in the country since independence and expansion of the 
Bulgarian state beginning in 1878.  These episodes corresponded typically with periods of 
intense international conflict or change.  They began with the Bulgarian independence struggle, 
then emerged again with the Balkans Wars (1912-13), World War I (1914-18) and its immediate 
aftermath.  They also occurred during the most intense periods of the Cold War, and most 
recently with the disintegration of the Cold War.  Koinova cites scholarship noting that from the 
time of the unification of Eastern Rumelia with the Principality of Bulgaria in 1885 to 1944,  
                                                                                                                                                            
private property by the authorities and their supporters (conversations with Dr. Krassen 
Stanchev, Director, Institute for Market Economics).
42 Ekici, p. 14.
43 Stamatov, esp. pp. 15-25. 
44 Ekici, pp. 3-4.
45 Library of Congress, Country Studies, “Bulgaria: Terrorist and Espionage Activities,” 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+bg0233) on 20.6.06, which 
notes “Although guilt was never established, the terrorist acts aroused ethnic feeling that 
supported the Bulgarization campaign.” George Shanduorkov, “Terrorism in Bulgaria,” 
Prehospital Disaster Medicine, 2003, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 66–70, at http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu
on 20.6.06.
46 Rossen V. Vassilev, “Post-Communist Bulgaria’s Ethnopolitics,” The Global Review of 
Ethnopolitics, vol. 1, no. 2, December 2001, p. 46 at 
http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics/archive/volume_I/issue_2/vassilev.PDF on 28.6.06 
and Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov, “Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria,” (Berlin: 
European Migration Centre), p. 32 at http://www.emz-
berlin.de/projekte_e/pj41_pdf/Marushiakova.pdf on 28.6.06.14
Bulgarian state policy towards toleration of practice and reproduction of minority culture and 
religion was inconsistent.
47  Ethno-nationalist conflicts in Bulgaria were notably absent during 
World War II while the conservative royal authoritarian regime enforced domestic stability while 
a nominal ally of the Axis to avoid the fate of fascist-occupied Greece and Yugoslavia.  The 
coming of Communist power and the intensification of the Cold War saw the Peoples’ Republic 
of Bulgaria as an eventual Warsaw Pact member sharing a common border with Greece and 
Turkey, states with US-allied regimes which soon joined NATO.  Another out of what would be 
a total of 11 emigration waves of Turkish and Muslim emigration out of Bulgaria occurred along 
with institutionalization of Marxist-Leninist economic and political structures in the 1950s.
48  A 
period of forced name changes of the Bulgarian Slavophone Muslim (“Pomak”) minority in the
early and mid-1970s détente period set the stage for a repeat of this process on a larger scale 15 
years’ later with the coming of perestroika and glasnost.  Both latter episodes occurred 
concomitantly with international political systemic changes disrupting the control mechanisms of 
the most closely pro-Soviet, Communist Bulgarian domestic regimes.  They typically reacted by 
seeking nationalist legitimacy through targeting perceived remnants of Ottoman domination and 
oppression.   
Mutafchieva makes the same claim: periods of relatively peaceful coexistence have 
broken down in Bulgaria along with increasing tensions and disruptions in the international 
political status quo.
49  However, the validity of this claim is controversial.  As noted, in the 
postwar era, the Bulgarian authorities attempted forcibly to change the names of the Bulgarian 
Slavophone Muslims, the so-called “Pomaks,” in the mid-1970s.  According to Andrey Ivanov, 
the violent civil conflicts in Cyprus and Lebanon at this time, with their essential international 
dimension, were a “point of departure” by the Bulgarian Communist authorities in projecting 
scenarios of potential minority attempts at secession.  Forced assimilation of the Pomaks was 
therefore an attempt to circumvent a potential international as well as domestic threat.
50  One 
might claim the US-USSR “détente” era as a disruption to the international systemic status quo; 
the declining intensity of great power conflict loosened the reins of control over their respective 
                                                
47 Koinova, p. 4.
48 Nuray Ekici, “The Diaspora of the Turks of Bulgaria in Turkey,” (Berlin: European Migration 
Centre), pp. 1-2 at www.emz-berlin.de/projekte_e/pj41_pdf/ekici.pdf on 20.6.06.  Antonina 
Zhelyazkova, director of the high-profile International Center for Minority Studies and 
Intercultural Relations in Sofia, notes that migrations across the Balkans, east-west and north-
south starting in the late medieval period, were relatively more frequent than in other regions of 
Europe with the Balkans as the border scene for conflict among the various empires: Antonina 
Zhelyazkova, “The Islamic Communities on the Balkans, and the complexes of the Balkan 
historiographers,” Kultura, 12 July 1996, p. 11.  Zhelyazkova also notes that Islam on the 
Balkans blended with rather than effaced pre-existing clan, pagan, and Christian group traditions, 
thereby maintaining a strong cultural differentiation among the self-perceived identities of the 
different Muslim communities which did emerge, which was sufficiently significant for the 
Sublime Porte to differentiate in both the trust and in the obligations it placed among the 
different Balkan Muslim communities, e.g. Gypsy Muslims still paid the poll tax, and the 
Ottoman authorities were more prone to distrust the loyalty of Albanian Muslims as prospective 
administrators.
49 Mutafchieva, p. 30.
50 Ivanov, p. 9.15
allies. Yet, this argument has a propensity to emerge ex post facto; one can readily find changes 
in the international systemic environment which correspond with nationalist political 
mobilization and conflict.  While both international systemic and individual level components 
are always present and always essential for a full explanation of a nationalist conflict, state-level 
factors are also essential, even paramount.  In other words, this category of factors includes the 
“public opinion” environment which reacts and responds to changes both at the international 
systemic level and structural-institutional challenges which individual leaders and political 
groups exploit.
Individual-level factors: the role of ideology
Political strategies develop in response to interaction with the political environment, and 
communal nationalistic values are an essential feature of the Balkan political environment today.  
Alexander Kolev finds that the main variable explaining the lack of violent nationalist conflict in 
transition Bulgaria unlike in other Balkan states was due to ideology.  Specifically, he finds a 
critical variable to be that the anti-Communist opposition in Bulgaria was explicitly anti-
nationalist.  The opposition’s unwillingness to use romantic, anti-Turkish/Muslim symbols to 
mobilize support derived from the exploitation of Bulgarian nationalist sentiments by the 
Communist ruling elite of the declining Marxist-Leninist regime.
51  One prominent Bulgarian 
intellectual noted that the “regeneration” policy appeared absurd to the liberal intelligentsia in 
Bulgaria, as its logic included changing not only the names of the living, but also the names of 
the dead, with the authorities tracing back genealogies as far back as records would permit.
52
Other analysts have noted that this consensus on not exploiting nationalist tensions had 
emerged among the top levels of the new reformist, former Communist/now Bulgarian Socialist 
Party (BSP) and the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) emerging counter elite.  The evident 
isolation of Bulgaria from any western allies while the Soviet mentor-patron was on the route to 
its own disintegration was critical.  Bulgaria had a potentially hostile Turkey as a powerful 
NATO member on its borders.  This fact further underlined the explosiveness of attempting to 
exploit Bulgarian romantic national anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim stereotypes.  Nevertheless, 
regional, BSP elites in Razgrad and other cities organized demonstrations against reversing the 
forced name changes.  Yet, at the national level, a tacit consensus quickly emerged among the 
BSP, UDF and MRF around democratization within parameters forbidding use of anti-minority 
appeals.
53  In the words of one Western analyst of the peaceful Bulgarian transition, democracy 
“made sense.”  It was the means by which to guarantee mutual security among elite factions in 
the midst of diversity.  Democratization was the way by which the different parties and ethnic 
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Nationalist Conflict in Post-Communist Eastern Europe,” (23.05.06 at  
http://socsci2.ucsd.edu/~aronatas/scrretreat/Kolev.Alex.doc)
52 Evgenyi Dainov, Director, Center for Social Practices, New Bulgarian University, “European 
Economies in Transition” Faculty Development in International Business’ seminar, International 
Business Center, Katz Graduate School of Business University of Pittsburgh, organizer, on 25 
May 2006, at the Elieff Center, American University in Bulgaria, funded by US Department of 
Education.
53 Rumyana Kolarova, “Tacit Agreements in the Bulgarian Transition to Democracy: Minority 
Rights and Constitutionalism,” The University of Chicago Roundtable, 1993, Symposium: The 
Rights of Minorities in East European Constitutionalism.16
groups developed a political means to coexist, and it appeared to be the only option.
54  Since 
1990, the MRF has continued to play a role as coalition balancer and power broker in an 
excellent East European variant of Donald Horowitz’s ideal-typical model for peaceful ethnic 
conflict management.  The Bulgarian ethnic majority electorate divides its support among 
multiple parties while a united minority party plays the role of necessary governing party 
coalition member and balancer.
55  In fact, the MRF has played this role for so long that among 
some observers, this fact is circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy among the former 
Communist ruling elite to create a political actor which would weaken the Bulgarian societal 
opposition to the comparatively well-disciplined and well-funded Bulgarian Socialist Party.
56
By way of comparison, in socialist Yugoslavia, liberal democratic elites were competing 
with authoritarians and radicals to appeal to the nationalist sentiments of the public in 
democratizing Yugoslavia.  Milosievic and his coalition allies among the nationalists and 
communist-era elite succeeded in marginalizing the liberal wing of his party before then 
proceeding to mobilize his coalition to seize control over Kosovo, Montenegro and Voivodina.
57  
Indeed, the pro-change intelligentsia play a critical role in determining the likelihood of a 
nationalistic behavior by a political system.
58  Individuals do make a difference.  Elaboration on 
the issue of why were nationalist issues not on the Bulgarian political agenda in motivating the 
revolutionary changes against a perceived, Quisling regime, unlike in the Serbian case, is 
necessary.  As Kolev himself alludes, the international systemic factor has also to be a critical 
element here differentiating the Serb and Bulgarian cases.
59  In short, the comparatively 
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moderate behavior of Turkey has to be a critical factor in explaining why the existing Bulgarian 
“powder keg” of ethnic conflict has not ignited.  A satisfactory explanation for Bulgaria’s 
relative peace cannot be found in Bulgaria alone.  As in the US or in any state, radical nationalist 
political entrepreneurs are always present, so the issue is why have they not gained more popular 
support.  
Milosievic and his cohort saw both a personal power and a national irredentist communal 
opportunity.  In their stereotypical view of their prospective adversaries and the international 
situation, the international community was essentially not intensely interested or committed to 
intervening seriously in the Balkans to prevent Serbia redressing on its own nationalist 
grievances left from Tito’s Communist Yugoslav republic borders.  These borders, decided by 
Tito during World War II, placed large Serb concentrations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 
among intermixed populations.  Milosievic’s Serbia moved forcefully to change the territorial 
and political status quo.  Meanwhile, in response to the Serb mobilization, radical nationalist 
forces subsequently gathered strength throughout the disintegrating Communist Yugoslav 
federation.  Mutual perceptions of opportunity for national self-determination overlay this initial
perception of threat from Belgrade.  The result was a violent conflict spiral through mutually 
belligerent violent policies that confirmed and reinforced perceptions of threat and affective 
collective rage among many Croats, Bosniaks, Kosovars and Serbs.  Collective memories of 
genocidal attacks in the twentieth century and before set the stage for this conflict spiral.
Kolev writes in explaining his focus on Bulgaria, “Interestingly, the mutually reinforcing 
character of nationalist and anti-Communist tendencies (although well-understood by the 
observers of the Yugoslav case) has not, to my knowledge, been conceptualized as a factor that 
should be explored in the context of other post-Communist countries.”
60  Here, Kolev’s 
definition of nationalism appears to be as an ethno-chauvinist ideology.  This study in this paper, 
however, views it as communal political sovereignty value for the members of a primary and 
terminal self-identity community.  Nationalism is not an ideology (although it can be part of an 
ideology).  By definition, a nationalistic actor through behavior demonstrates an intense 
commitment to this value to the point that this motivation shapes its political perceptions and 
behavior patterns sufficiently to differentiate its behavior from non-nationalistic actors.  
Nationalistic actors are more prone, to see the political environment in terms of threats and 
opportunities, to stereotype the sources of those perceived threats and opportunities, and to 
overestimate their own relative capabilities.  
Continuing to focus on nationalism as ideology, Kolev reiterates, 
I believe though that if we are looking for a factor explaining the presence or 
absence of nationalist conflict (and possibly, as a result of it, violence) in the 
different countries of post-Communist Eastern Europe, it is not how threatened 
the Communist elite was and how easy it could manipulate society, but rather 
whether the anti-Communists were nationalist or not, and thus whether they 
tended to define political conflict in non-ethnic terms and to cooperate with the 
ethnic minorities or not.  The stances of minorities’ leaderships were also highly 
important, but they were often conditioned, in addition to influences coming from 
                                                                                                                                                            
and interests, and that how a given nationalist conflict would play itself out depends both on 
relationships among the fields and on relationships within each field.”
60 Kolev, p. 14.18
the minorities’ external homelands, by the openness of the anti-Communist 
parties towards cooperation across ethnic lines, which had an effect on the 
policies of the external homelands too.
61
Although Kolev highlights in his paper the refusal of the Bulgarian opposition focusing on the 
Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) to work with explicitly nationalistic parties, the UDF was 
not averse to using anti-Turkish symbols in its own, later campaigns after 1990.  UDF hostility to 
the de facto Turkish minority party, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), stemmed 
partly from the latter’s 1992 withdrawal from and collapse of the UDF-led coalition government 
that replaced the Bulgarian Socialist (previously Communist) Party government in 1991.  An 
ineffective “government of experts” acted as caretaker until the 1994 national parliamentary 
elections which again brought the Bulgarian Socialist Party back into power.  It fell in early 1997 
in the midst of hyperinflation due to lack of economic reform, leading to early elections.
62  Ivan 
Kostov of the UDF then emerged as Prime Minister, a position which he held until 2001.  In the 
2000 municipal elections campaign, Ivan Kostov made the following statement: 
Interviewer: There are two political versions about the negotiations with the EU -
one is that the things we have to sacrifice are still to come- and the other that 
we've already paid what we had to and our standard of living will improve. Which 
one do you consider right? 
Kostov: If we limit the question to its economic side, the second thesis is more correct. 
That is, we've already paid for the liberalization of prices and should expect things only 
to improve. But if we consider all the problems that appear on our way to Europe, it looks 
as though there are still challenges to come. What does the price entail? It's good that we 
already know what we want - one or two things that a great majority demands. But do we 
have the strength to point out what the price is? Now we have to say what we don't want 
to be, what we want to leave out of Europe. Hard thing. We want to leave a part of our 
morality, a part of our oriental nature. This is not an easy thing. From this point of view, 
there are still a lot of things we have to sacrifice.
63 (underline emphasis the author’s)
As living embodiments of this “oriental” legacy, such statements might well strike a Bulgarian 
Turk or Muslim as insulting.  
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Meanwhile, according to Kolev, the Turkish government has favored Ahmed Dogan, the 
leader of the MRF, and refused to cooperate with more radical Turkish figures such as Adem 
Kenan, a former colleague of Dogan.  Claiming that Dogan had forsaken the interests of the 
Bulgarian Turks in favor of political power, Kenan broke with him and formed his own 
unregistered party, the Democratic Party of the Turks in Bulgaria.  Kenan’s rhetoric turned to 
Turkish nationalism and he has continued to make radical and demagogic public statements 
which have attracted the legal attention of the Bulgarian state prosecutor: 
Kenan insulted ethnic Bulgarians, calling them "former slaves" and saying that 
the "Turks, who, as an imperial nation, dominated for 500 years, are offended to 
have to integrate with their former slaves". Bulgaria was under Ottoman rule for 
nearly five centuries, from 1396 until 1878. Interviewed later by the 168 Chasa
weekly, he declared himself in favour of a federation and referred to ethnic 
Bulgarians as "mules". The regional prosecutor said his office has collected 
sufficient evidence warranting criminal proceedings against Kenan.  A month ago, 
a court in Shumen sentenced Kenan to pay a 600 leva (307 euros) fine for 
offending Bulgarians by calling them a "nation of freaks" in an interview he had 
given in 2005.
64
Kenan has been in the news again partly as a foil for the xenophobic platform of Volin Siderov
and his insurgent, “Attack” party which exploded on the Bulgarian political scene in 2005.  
Kenan has been in the Bulgarian National Assembly, including the Grand National Assembly 
which wrote and adopted the July 1991 Bulgarian Constitution, and later, during the regular 
National Assembly in 1995-97.  He formally split with Dogan in 1992 over the constitution 
which he rejects because it does not include federalism and autonomy for the Turkish regions.
65  
The MRF, almost perennially in a governing coalition or in negotiations to join one, remains 
virtually the sole representative of the Bulgarian Turks in the national Bulgarian political 
process.  Dogan himself has won accolades from the European press: “Those who doubt that 
Islam and Europe can cohabit were not in Sofia this week. There Ahmed Dogan, leader of 
Bulgaria's ethnic Turkish minority and probably the continent's most successful Muslim 
politician, celebrated the 15th anniversary of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, the pro-
business party he founded.”
66
In sum, in Bulgaria ethno-chauvinist ideology among the ruling elite has been relatively 
absent, but it does show a potential to move in this direction in the midst of electoral 
competition.  Suspicions are present.  One MRF representative asserted in 2002 that the UDF 
“covertly promoted the perception” that representation of Turks in the internal and external 
security services will lead to a “Macedonia-type” situation in Bulgaria.
67  Kolev notes that  
nationalistic political entrepreneurs are publicly active in Bulgaria although until recently they 
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have been marginal political actors.  Kolev claims that the dissidents leading the opposition to 
the Communists, later Socialists, were so uniformly disillusioned by the tyranny of the Zhivkov 
regime that all major political tendencies, nationalist or not, were first and foremost anti-
Communist.  They opposed a regime which had attempted and failed to exploit what were in 
effect ethnic cleansing policies in the name of Bulgarian nationalism.  In a word, in the view of 
the Bulgarian public, the Communist experience had for years completely delegitimized 
nationalism as part of a Bulgarian legitimation ideology.  Rejection of their policies 
overwhelmed the appeal of traditional stereotypical images pervasive in Bulgarian national 
perceptions which are anti-Turkish.  Ironically, then, as Kolev notes, the transition to democracy 
in Bulgaria was the catalyst for defusing nationalist conflict in Bulgaria.
68
The fact that Bulgarian concerns were focusing on severe economic difficulties of the late 
1980s is important but not sufficient for explaining the absence of Bulgarian nationalism in the 
policy making process since 1990.  Comparatively, Serbia’s macroeconomic performance has 
been one of impoverishment of much of the population since 1990.  The Yugoslav economy had 
a decades-long history of sending guest workers abroad and integration with the western political 
economy.  The Bulgarian economy was much more dependent upon the USSR.  Consequently, 
the comparatively insulated Bulgarian economy experienced much greater difficulty in the late 
1980s in adapting to the end of Soviet subsidies.  Food literally was not available in 1989-90.  
Animal herds on collective farms disappeared as people pilfered and slaughtered the livestock 
for food.
69
In contrast to Bulgaria, the Communist regime in Tito’s Yugoslavia acknowledged 
nationality while suppressing ethno-chauvinist nationalism under the slogan, “brotherhood and 
unity.”  The symbols of ethno-sectarian nationalism would be a legitimation mechanism for a 
political entrepreneur, such as Milosievic, thereby undermining Yugoslav identity.  The 
nationalist grievances which Milosievic exploited, however, were not grievances which 
Milosievic himself created and implanted in the mind of the mass Serb public.  These grievances 
derived from the nature of the control system which characterized Tito’s Yugoslavia.  A critical 
component of this control system was politically weakening a disproportionately powerful 
national constituent community of Yugoslavia, the Serbs.
70  Giving Kosovo and Voivodina 
republic status in all but name, including a right to a vote equal to Serbia’s on the Federal State 
Council, was necessary to placate the suspicions of the other, smaller nations of Yugoslavia.  
Yet, it also set the stage for the emergence of Serb national grievances.  From the typical 
perspective of Serb nationalists, division and separation from Serbia of Kosovo in particular was 
a crime against the Serb nation.  As a central part of the Serb symbolic national identity, it was 
readily and inevitably a theme for manipulation by a new, emerging elite challenging the 
decaying, post-Tito, bureaucratic, communist order.  
For Bulgaria, by contrast, the issue of “Bulgaria irredenta” was one which had not been 
an issue since the 1950s.  The Bulgarian “national ideals” since 1878 had focused on rejoining to 
Bulgaria those lands which the international system had taken from control by the Bulgarian 
state.  Russian liberation of Bulgaria had led Bulgaria to control what is Macedonia and Greek 
Thrace today under the terms of the San Stefano peace treaty ending the Russo-Turkish War of 
1877-78.  The other European great powers had sought the preservation of the disintegrating 
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Ottoman empire to contain Russian expansion at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.  They 
demanded that Russia as the intervening power on behalf of the Orthodox Balkan peoples against 
Ottoman rule accept a drastic reduction in the size and status of its new Bulgarian ally or face 
war.  Later, Bulgarian foreign policy succeeded in annexing much of Rumelia as part of a 
sovereign kingdom relatively soon, but the Ottoman empire remained in control of historic 
Macedonia.  The first Balkan war of 1912 saw Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece ally to drive Ottoman 
Turkey out of the Balkans with the exception of a small territory in eastern Rumelia.  Almost 
immediately, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece went to war over the division of the territories from 
which they had just expelled Ottoman control.  Turkey now allied with Greece against Bulgaria.  
Bulgaria ended up annexing approximately 15% of historic Macedonia in the Pirin mountain 
region (the site of the American University in Bulgaria), but most remained in the hands of 
Greece and particularly Serbia.  International pressures during World War I and II caused 
Bulgaria to enter into conflict with Serbia and Greece over these territories.  Consequently, 
Bulgaria allied successively with the central and axis powers against the French and British allies 
of Greece and Serbia.   Bulgaria, then, was also a nominal ally of the Turkish Ottoman empire in 
World War I, while in World War II, Bulgaria challenged Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity along 
with the various nationalist forces which opposed Belgrade’s control.  The coming of 
Communist power to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia saw the brutal suppression of all political actors 
openly advocating ethno-nationalist programs, mimicking Stalin’s violent, systematic repression 
of actual and suspected advocates of nationalism in the USSR in the 1930s.  The USSR had 
pressured the Bulgarian communist leadership to recognize the population of the Pirin 
Macedonian region of Bulgaria as Macedonians, depending upon the state of relations between 
Belgrade and Moscow.  By the early 1960s, this pressure had stopped.
71    
The upshot is that since 1912, the nationalist components of Bulgarian foreign policy 
predominantly focused on a challenge from Belgrade, the capital of another Slavic Orthodox 
nation, and not Turkey.  After the Second World War, Soviet and American control over their 
respective NATO and Warsaw Pact allies made a likelihood of direct conflict between Turkey 
and Bulgaria unlikely.  The greatest likelihood of violent international conflict in the European 
territories of the former Ottoman Empire was rather between two NATO members, Greece and 
Turkey.  As noted above, Turkey’s invasion of northern Cyprus would stir Bulgarian nationalist 
sentiment regarding the possibility of a similar Turkish move into Haskovo, Kurdzhali and 
Momchilgrad.  These towns are in the Rhodopi mountain region, close to the border with 
Turkey, which Bulgaria annexed during the Balkan wars and have a Turkish population 
concentration.  
Socialist Yugoslavia became the main trading partner with Communist Bulgaria.  Despite 
periodic concerns in Washington that Moscow might attempt forcibly to install a pro-Soviet 
regime in avowedly non-aligned Belgrade, relations between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were 
cooperative.  Later, with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, democratic Bulgaria was the first state 
to recognize the newly independent state of Macedonia.  UDF leader Philip Dimitrov was the 
prime minister of Bulgaria at this time, acting in accordance with his own ideological 
predispositions.  Clearly Bulgaria, which was in the midst of an economic depression and 
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believing itself to be without strong allies in pursuit of an irredentist policy, would not engage in 
international aggression.
In sum, the international political environment has not encouraged Bulgarian or Turkish 
nationalism in the direction of perceiving an opportunity to redraw the boundaries in 
Southeastern Europe.  Consequently, the latent anti-Turkish stereotypical components of 
Bulgarian nationalism have not received encouragement through an intentional or unintentional 
presentation of an opportunity to Bulgaria by the Great Powers.  One should note that this latent 
anti-Turkish suspicion is not insignificant.  The Bulgarian mass media in the 1990s had 
periodically broadcast television programs which highlighted the changing ethnic population
demographics in the Rhodopi due to the higher ethnic Turkish birthrate and the migration of 
ethnic Bulgarians to urban centers.
72  This writer recalls in 1999 during the NATO air assault on 
Yugoslavia in the midst of the escalating conflict between Serb and Kosovar national movements 
that Bulgarians were overwhelmingly opposed to the NATO attack.
73  Individuals spontaneously 
raised their concern that Kosovo independence through violent resistance would inspire by way 
of its political success a similar movement in Kurdzhali, the city populated predominantly by 
ethnic Turks in the Rhodopi mountain region of Bulgaria which has a majority Turkish 
population.  Following the Bulgarian ratification of the Convention on the Protection of Ethnic 
Minorities in 1999 under the UDF government of Ivan Kostov, Bulgarian state television began a 
weekly broadcast of news and information in Turkish (with Bulgarian subtitles) which has 
continued to generate controversy.  
Following a common pattern throughout post-Communist Eastern Europe, Kostov and 
the UDF lost control of the parliamentary majority in the following June 2001 parliamentary 
elections.  The former king, Simeon Saxecoburgotski, announced literally only weeks before the 
2001 elections that he was a candidate to be prime minister as leader of his party, “National 
Movement of Simeon the II” (NMSII), winning 50% of the seats in parliament.  The majority 
coalition again included Ahmed Dogan’s Movement for Rights and Freedoms.  By the 2005
parliamentary elections, the UDF had disintegrated amid leadership as well as policy disputes, 
and the BSP is today the largest party in the governing coalition which includes again the MRF 
and NMSII.  The disintegration of the UDF as the vehicle for demands for change has opened up 
avenues for the exploitation of Bulgarian nationalist sentiments, with the surprise emergence of 
Volin Siderov’s xenophobic “Attack” party winning 8.5% of the votes.  Siderov had previously 
been the chief editor of the UDF’s daily party newspaper, Democratsia (Democracy).  
As Marshall and Gurr note, with the decline and disintegration of the Cold War, 
international systemic constraints on nationalist mobilization have decreased, along with overall 
decrease in support for authoritarian client regimes by their respective superpower patrons and 
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their allies.
74  State and elite factors thus potentially have more impact in the polity.  In Bulgaria, 
the 2005 national parliamentary elections saw an increase in ethnic mobilization around the issue 
of supposedly excessive minority political representation in the policy making process.  The 
emergence of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms is of course feasible within the framework 
of the liberal regime in Bulgaria since 1989.  Its continuous role as a current or prospective 
coalition partner has helped satisfy the utilitarian demands and aspirations of Bulgarian Turks, 
lessening prospective support for more militant Turkish nationalist actors.  Yunal Lutfi, deputy 
speaker of Bulgarian National Assembly, and deputy chairman of the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms (MRF), which is currently part of the three-party government coalition, noted 
It [the status of the Bulgarian Turks (BD)] was discussed [in a meeting with 
visiting Turkish President Ahmet Sezer (BD)], in the context of the rapid pace of 
integration in terms of the Bulgarian Turks' participation at all levels of 
government. As I said already, our two ministers also attended the meeting, three 
ministers, I mean. What we told the president actually was that about 5,000 ethnic 
Turks are participating in the national administration in all ministries as well as at 
the level of the provincial and municipal administrations. There has never been 
anything like this before. We also have 34 deputies. In this context, we have no
reason at all to tell the Turkish president that there is any discrimination against 
the Turkish minority or that it is being deprived of its rights.
75
MPs belonging to this same party have warned in February 2006 against ethnic Turkish 
nongovernmental organizations in Bulgaria from undertaking measures which are 
potentially provocative in the view of the Bulgarian ethnic majority in the light of 
Bulgaria’s successful EU accession effort.
76  According to the BBC Monitoring service, 
Lyutvi Mestan was protesting against a two-month old petition drive under the leadership 
of Menderes Kungyun, chairman of “National Turkish Unity.”  The petition demands 
“the official recognition of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria,” as well as “the opening of a 
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Turkish state university, the abolition of the constitutional ban on the establishment of 
ethnic parties, the introduction of study of the Turkish language for all Bulgarian citizens 
who identify themselves as Turks, and the opening of a Turkish-language broadcasts 
directorate at Bulgarian National Radio and TV.”  Another Bulgarian Turkish 
nongovernmental organization, Millyet-Trakya [“the Millet of Thrace”], is organizing the 
signature drive, providing fifty “coordinators.”  Mestan warned that this petition risked 
polarizing Bulgarian public opinion and therefore threatened to undermine Bulgaria’s EU 
accession drive.
77  
The comparative absence of ethno-nationalistic policy patterns among Bulgarian 
foreign and domestic policies until the June 2005 elections has had a supportive 
international environment.  At least as much credence must be found among the relative 
dearth of propitious Bulgarian and Turkish state-level trends and factors which would 
otherwise interact with the disintegration of the bipolar Cold War system.  Specifically, 
Turkey has never played with regard to the Turks of Bulgaria the attraction role of 
Milosievic’s Serbia with regard to the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
At times, Kolev slips back into individual reification by claiming the Milosievic’s 
“masterful” manipulation of nationalist sentiments allowed him to reconstitute the Serbian 
Communist party.  He incorporated nationalism in it and circumvented the more nationalistic 
parties.  This explanation should note that Milosievic began his national career representing a 
Belgrade-based bureaucracy.  Milosievic claimed initially he was leading an “anti-bureaucratic” 
revolution on behalf of Serb rights.  By acting to change the constitutional framework of 
Yugoslavia to redress what the Serbs perceived as injustices his manipulation had a veneer of 
status quo legality.  The upshot is that the existing institutional political and economic structures 
and interests which Milosievic successfully brought into his ruling coalition also had to be 
placated. They would legitimate and support these policy outcomes so as to achieve 
predominance by a Serb political entrepreneur seeking primarily personal power.
78  In a word, if 
Milosievic had not appeared on the scene to add Serb nationalism to this ruling bureaucratic 
coalition of interests, then someone else surely would have done so.  Milosievic rose successfully 
because he was not an “outsider,” but rather, a creature of these institutional interests.
Political elites have always been present on the Bulgarian political scene who attempted 
to mobilize the Bulgarian public behind an explicitly nationalist program.
79  Part of the 
explanation, then, as to why Bulgaria has not been the scene or more violence also has to lie in 
the fact that Turkey, unlike Milosievic’s Serbia, did not encourage Bulgarian Turks to look to 
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Ankara as a source of political succor, not to mention separation.  Ankara’s foreign policy during 
the “regeneration” process was comparatively quite passive, limiting itself to some movement of 
military units to the border, while raising the issue in international forums.  However, with the 
Cold War division of Europe still a factor in 1989, few could seriously believe that Turkey 
would risk a military conflict with the USSR (not to mention Bulgaria) over the fate of Turkish 
minorities in Bulgaria.  Meanwhile, the non-nation state of Turkey faced its own Kurdish 
rebellion in the southeast, suppressing the rise of political Islamism, and entering the EU.  US 
and Western interests also coincided with the Turkish authorities’ aims in this regard.  The 
upshot is that perceived relative capability is essential as a necessary (but not sufficient) 
prerequisite for nationalistic behavior.  Bosnian Serb nationalists could readily assume and 
expect that Belgrade would assist them with arms and material, which it did, although Belgrade 
would never formally invade to annex part or all of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia.
The Future of the Balkans as the EU-declared Test Case for Preventative Diplomacy
This study assumes that the desirable “state-building” perception among the attentive 
public that the central sovereign political authority is neutral and thereby dispenses justice 
without bias towards different ethno-religious groups will not prevail in a multinational state, in 
the Balkans or elsewhere.
80  Irredentist tendencies among neighboring, diaspora components of 
Balkan nation-states (Serbs, Albanians, Croats) in Bosnia and elsewhere will tend towards 
collective prevailing views that the governing international (UN/NATO/EU) mandate authorities 
have a bias against them in favor of “the other.” The international mandate authorities will 
therefore face the dilemma of relying on fundamentally anti-democratic, authoritarian political 
mechanisms to maintain the political status quo in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Macedonia.  Communities having submarginal capability for national self-determination 
(Macedonians, Bosniaks) will accept the international mandate for protection.
Some analysts claim that the legislative arena is the centerpiece of the parliamentary 
democracy.
81  Implementation of legislation in the form of law, or the lack of it, however, is very 
likely to be the source of perceived oppression that generates grass roots social resistance 
movements that can result in violence.  Implementation implies ultimately the state using its 
authority, including its coercive power, to enforce the perceived will of the community.  In the 
current prevailing system of world norms, national constitutions typically proclaim their 
commitment to basic human rights.  The foundational international legal instruments for global 
commitment to these ideals are the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and its 
subsequent binding multilateral international legal treaties, the International Covenants on Civil 
and Political Rights, on the one hand, and Social and Economic Rights, on the other hand.
82  In 
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an increasingly complex public policy reality, implementation is increasingly important.  A 
worldwide phenomenon is the increasing conversion of political issues into judicial questions as 
a method of conflict resolution.
83  In 2000, the Bulgarian Constitutional Court ruled by a 
majority of one that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms was not an illegal party.  According 
to the Bulgarian Constitution, ethnic or religiously-based parties are forbidden.  The Movement 
for Rights of Freedoms is the de facto Turkish minority party but of course its name does not 
indicate it as such.  Nevertheless, Volin Siderov and the Attack party have made the role of the 
MRF in the governing coalition as a balancer its main platform.  Siderov claims that the presence 
of the MRF in the government serves to satisfy the demands of the EU and the US which has 
imperialistic ambitions towards the Middle East through reliance upon Turkey.  Consequently, 
Bulgaria’s national interest including its ethnic Bulgarian identity are at risk of sacrifice in order 
to promote US interests in the Middle East.
The EU’s ESDP commitment to conflict prevention satisfies the tactical requirement to 
coordinate national government policies.  As Cottam and Cottam explain, unilateral conflict 
intervention will be more vulnerable to the perception emerging among the target population and 
government that expressions of universal human rights justifications are a guise.  Coordination 
ideally diminishes the ability of the target to play one foreign office against another, for example, 
on questions of commercial advantage.  Thereby, considerable reduction of the bargaining 
position of the target regarding the initiator should occur as a consequence.
84  Even in this case, 
however, a common EU position while differentiating among the different former Yugoslav 
nations risks intensifying in-group and out-group differentiation.  To the extent that EU 
membership is supposedly associated with being “European” and therefore, “civilized,” it may 
serve to intensify social competition.  As in the current case of Montenegro, secession may 
appear as the fast track to “joining Europe.”  The appeal of the opportunity to “join Europe” by 
separating from Serbia was arguably a factor increasing May 2006 referendum support for 
Montenegran separation.
85  Intensification of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a more tragic 
case of the consequences of unfortunate “European” policies regarding the peoples of the former 
Yugoslavia.  Many argue that the violent conflict intensified there due to European Community 
acquiescence to German demands for premature international recognition of the sovereignty of 
Croatia and Slovenia.
86
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One danger is the reification of the so-called “clash of civilizations” hypothesis.  Those 
Balkan groups which did view the Serbs as a source of threat are likely to have their stereotypes 
confirmed by the differential EU accession process.  To the extent that the EU and NATO are 
synonymous in the typical view of a Serb or Russian nationalist, then the view of a conspiracy 
against the Orthodox world is more likely to receive mistaken confirmation.  This danger 
increases as Kosovo increases the pace of its European integration policies.
87  Kosovo’s quest for 
national self-determination has gained EU acquiescence in order to begin to develop and 
stabilize this region.  Serb nationalism opposing it then appears to be an adversary of Euro-
Atlantic policy aims and objectives in the Balkans.  Kosovo nationalism appears to conform with 
EU objectives in opposition to the obstreperous Serbs.  The root of the dilemma again lies in the 
failure of the international community to conceptualize national self-determination for all 
aspiring nations as a human right.
88  This right must also extend to the Serbs.  Again, the strategy 
of NATO and the EU is stabilization in response to irresistible changes but no redrawing of 
borders until the political polarization escalates to the point that division becomes unavoidable.  
Note that observers continue to confirm that Bulgarian minorities have not shown 
themselves susceptible to inroads by al-Qai’dah Islamic militants.  This fact is further evidence 
of the surprising lack of serious challenge to the Bulgarian state from Bulgaria’s Turkish 
minorities.  In contrast, a theme appearing regularly in the Serb media for the attentive public is 
that the Serb struggle is part of a broader struggle against pan-Islamic radicalism and aggression.  
Media reports citing sources in the Serb military intelligence community continue this refrain 
that Serbia is on the frontline against pan-Islamic militancy.
89  Mass news media reports in 
Macedonia also claim that Wahhabist elements have made inroads among ethnic Albanians 
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Kosovo,” BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom; Nov 24, 2004 Excerpt from report by 
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Rada Trajkovic as deputy chairwoman of the Serb National Council for Northern Kosovo-
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89 For example, see BBC Monitoring Service, “Serb officials warn about Al-Qa'idah activity in 
Kosovo,” BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom; Nov 24, 2004 Excerpt from report by 
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2004 at http://search.ft.com/search/articles.html on 17.6.06 (Colonel Momir Stojanovic, director 
of the Military Security Agency equates the presence of Wahhabi religious activists in the 
Sandzak and elsewhere with the presence of al-Qaeda operatives); BBC Monitoring Service, 
“Serbian terrorism expert warns of Wahhabi presence in Bosnia, Kosovo,” Source: Borba, 
Belgrade, in Serbian 11 Jul 05 p 2, BBC Monitoring Service - United Kingdom; Jul 18, 2005, 
http://search.ft.com/s03/search/article.html?id=050718003995.28
throughout the “Illyrian” lands of the Balkans.
90  This claim, however, has not succeeded in 
persuading the US, NATO and the EU to ally with Serb nationalism.  One conceptualization of 
the US-declared “war on terrorism” is that it is ultimately a conflict between pan-Arab and pan-
Islamist political movements in the Middle East threatening American allies there.  If so, then 
Serbia still as yet does not have much to offer as a prospective ally until and unless pan-
Albanianism, Bosniak nationalism or pan-Turanism acquire a strong pan-Islamic component.  
Indications that such tendencies as possible are present, but these tendencies, however, do not 
currently challenge the Albanian, Bosniak or Turkish ethnic secular, pro-EU oriented elite.  
As the International Crisis Group noted specifically in relation to a candidate area for 
violent ethno-sectarian conflict and secession, the Sandzak region: 
Since the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia began in 1991, Serbia has been 
deeply immersed in its own identity crisis and struggled to deal with areas that 
have an ethnically mixed population. Many problems in Sandzak -- a bad 
economy, low standard of living, inadequate educational and health care facilities, 
a dysfunctional, corrupt judiciary and civil administration, and an inept, corrupt 
and brutal police force – are mirrored in nearly every other municipality in the 
republic. But in an ethnically mixed area, dysfunctional and corrupt government 
becomes distorted by an ethnic lens that transforms every failure or mistake into a 
deliberate attack by the ruling majority against the subject minority. Sandzak is a 
case in point.
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This danger is more or less true in the context of every case of ethnic majority-minority social 
competition.  The question is, then, why has not more conflict been evident in Bulgaria with its 
large Turkish minority.  Bosniak nationalism is comparatively weak, and as such, it shows a 
comparatively greater degree of willingness, like Macedonian political community identity self-
expression, to compromise with external intervenors representing the Contact Group.  A 
consideration of the perceived capability of the source of challenge is important for approaching 
the issue of stereotypical images in shaping behavior is necessary.  Perhaps, as among many 
Bosniaks in the Sandzak, the prevailing view among the Turkish minority in Bulgaria sees itself 
1) as in an inferior position relative to the ethnic majority, yet social mobility options particularly 
via MRF patronage in an EU-integrating Bulgaria, do appear to be available, and 2) the option of 
appeal to Turkey as a patron state is not plausible in their prevailing view.
92  Bosnia-Herzegovina 
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92 The International Crisis Group notes, however, that the Refah party, the predecessor to the 
ruling, nominally Islamist, Justice and Development party in Turkey, apparently provided 
financial support to the respective organizations of the Mufti of Sandzak, Muamer Zukorlic, the 
Mesihat Islamic Community of Sandzak (IZ), and of Sulejman Uglanin, the most prominent 
regional leader of the Sandzak Bosniaks, through his Democratic Action Party (using the same 29
exists because of the international community’s military intervention and presence, while 
Turkey, of course, is distant and confronts its own Kurdish minority nationalist movement.  
Indeed, Bosniaks in “historic Sandzak” areas within Montenegro have chosen to participate in 
non-ethnic parties in Montenegro and have shown little interest in cooperating with their Bosniak 
brethren in Serbia.
93  In Serbia’s Sandzak area, however, Islamic clerics have increased their 
political influence through the 1990s concomitantly with the deepening economic and political 
crises in Yugoslavia until Milosievic’s departure on 5 October 2000.
94  Partial evidence indicates 
that their influence continues to grow.
95
Integrationist Strategies: “Different but Equal” Conflict Resolution Through Identity 
Transformation
To develop a culture of peace, developing a community-wide primary allegiance through 
provision of justice is necessary.  Martha L. and Richard W. Cottam conclude their work, 
Nationalism and Politics: The Political Behavior of Nation States (2001), with an overview of 
community identity-based intra-state, conflict resolution strategies.  They note that the basis for a 
peace strategy is integration of minorities in order to generate identification with the territorial 
community.  A plan of action for developing a population-wide first-intensity identity with the 
territorial community defines the essence of an integration strategy.
The formulation of an acceptable integration strategy is essential when 
1) an identity groups knows that it lacks the necessary capability to become independent
2) but it also knows that, if necessary, some potential exists to try to acquire that 
capability.  They will attempt to do so if and when its members feel that their existence as a 
group comes under threat.
96  
For a group which does not identify with the territorial community of the non-nation state 
at the first or second-intensity level but which also understands that it lacks the capability to 
achieve and preserve independence, it may prefer autonomy.  A gradually intensifying process of 
identification with the territorial community may come into motion through the option of 
autonomy in such a situation.  By providing groups with greater capability and decisionmaking 
power in their region or state and competitive power in the broader country government, these 
forms of integration strategies address the political dimensions of a plan of action for creating a 
first intensity attachment with the broader territorial community.  Nevertheless, failure often 
characterizes these efforts.  Incentives for cooperation with other identity groups in the 
multiethnic state ultimately to produce a new, third identity would involve federal efforts to 
promote economic integration and to maintain the country’s defensive capabilities.
97
According to Cottam and Cottam, the unwillingness of a significant section of the 
territorial community to identity at first-intensity level with that community is the essential 
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feature of a non-nation state.
98  Once again, a plan of action for developing a population-wide 
first-intensity identity with the territorial community, rather than with a neighboring mother 
state, defines the essence of an integration strategy.
99  An integration strategy needs to be the 
focus of a human rights strategy in relationship to national community self-identification.  A 
formula which usually best serves the interests of conflict avoidance in cases in which aspiring 
national communities are territorially homogeneous in a non-nation state which incorporates one 
or several aspiring national communities which have the capability to achieve independence 
would grant those aspiring national communities the right of national self-determination.  These 
aspiring national communities are unlikely to accommodate efforts to attract a first-intensity 
attachment to the territorial community as long as these communities perceive a real option for 
independence.
100  Consequently, if and when Kosovo becomes independent, one should expect 
that a Macedonia with its large Albanian minority will probably have to remain under 
international mandate.    
The psychological and political dimensions which integration strategies (say, a 
potentially successful one between Serbia and Bosniaks) would have to address are several.
4 factors determining difficulty of integration: 1) Relative capability; 2) Perception of cultural 
distance; 3) Complexity of social mobility; and 4) Perception of relative superiority/inferiority
101
1) In terms of the relative capability which they perceive themselves as having, identity 
groups in non-nation states vary greatly.  Only institutional and social conditions which offer 
broad sovereignty just short of independence would satisfy groups which see themselves as quite 
close to having the necessary capability for independence.  At the other end of the scale would be 
groups whose relative capability would be sufficiently low to offer very little prospective 
capability for independence.  Assurances of equality with other groups rather than autonomy 
would be satisfactory forms of integration.
102  Bulgaria’s Turks and Serbia’s remaining Bosniak 
minority in the Sandzak would perhaps be in this category as long as the option of joining a 
patron state appears to be unfeasible while the maintenance of their own existence as a 
community is not in question.  
2) The distance between identity groups in culture, race, and religion determine social-
creativity options.  Reducing the importance of physical characteristics, religion, and culture as 
foci of comparison would be a requirement in states with core communities which are not yet 
nation-states.  The opportunity to construct a third identity which the people of the territorial 
community commonly share may emerge through the ongoing evolution of the characteristics of 
the core community through importing elements of non-core group culture.  Political integration, 
therefore, is a largely psychological process.
103  The prerequisites for European integration may 
play a useful role here with the “Copenhagen Criteria” for joining the EU including legal 
protection for the rights of minorities. 
As Cottam and Cottam note, if no core community is present, and if among the various 
communities the cultural, racial and religious disparity is great, then greater complexity will 
occur in efforts to generate a third identity.  Having the public evaluate differences positively 
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when they emphasize them as comparison standards would be the necessary outcome of a 
formula having multiple facets.  Conflict avoidance can occur when social comparisons are 
different but equally positive.
104  Arguably this distance is perceived to be great between the 
Orthodox and Turkish or Albanian or Slavic Muslim communities in the Balkans.  
3) Cottam and Cottam note the complexity of social mobility.  An important technique in 
integration and, ultimately, in the formation of a common identity is promoting mobility 
opportunities, which serve to break down the boundaries between groups.  If groups, however, 
are mutually exclusive, showing extreme cultural strength as characterizing them, including 
linguistic uniqueness, a history with substantial relative elaboration, and institutional 
prerogatives in the society, then paralysis will characterize group identities.  Promoting mobility 
among groups to decrease group identity, then, cannot occur.
105  This situation appears more 
likely to apply in the Balkans regarding mutual perceptions of Muslims and non-Muslims.  It 
does not apply to Montenegrans and Serbs.  They are more likely to experience the velvet 
divorce which the Czechs and Slovaks exhibited.
106  Overall, however, European integration 
arguably aims to create a regional market with increasingly porous borders to allow greater 
opportunities for greater social mobility within a culturally-diverse European public space.
4) Cottam and Cottam note that the extent to which groups perceive each other as 
superior or inferior is possibly most important.  These judgments manifest themselves in the 
form of stereotypical imagery (e.g. “Turkish slavery,” “oriental nature,” Bulgaria as a “nation of 
freaks” and “former slaves”).  Breaking these images, then, is central to a workable integration 
strategy if this situation inheres.  The prevalence of a far more complex and nonjudgmental view 
would be an objective.  It would replace the implicitly judgmental view which manifests a high 
degree of stereotyping of the community which other communities have stereotyped.  The 
requirement of acceptance of and respect of group differences and change in expectations about 
other group members’ behavior relates this process to the second dimension (perceived cultural 
distance).
107
For comparison with the Muslim (Pomak), Roma (Gypsy) (but not Turkish) minority in a 
Bulgaria utilitarian integration strategy: usually, but not always, the appropriate integration path 
for those minority communities which recognize that they lack the capability to make any claim 
for some share of sovereignty is a utilitarian strategy.
108  Politically, integration strategies would 
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have to address the particular needs, demands and alternatives regarding the capability, power, 
and rewards of the various groups which they have accrued within the existing political system.  
Cottam and Cottam cite Donald Horowitz who lists a number of typical mechanisms which state 
authorities have used in this portion of integration strategies.  These typical mechanisms include
1) producing multiple channels for acquiring power to disperse group conflict.  
Consequently, these mechanisms may distribute power across institutions.
2) arrangements which promote intragroup conflict rather than intergroup conflict
3) policies which promote intergroup cooperation
4) policies which encourage cross-group alignments with their basis in interests rather 
than group identity.
5) policies which reduce dissatisfaction through reducing the various kinds of disparities 
between groups.
109
Psychologically, integration strategies would have to remove the incentives to rely on 
competition and conflict to satisfy identity needs by providing options to different identity 
groups in a polity for social mobility and social creativity, i.e. different but equal thinking among 
ethnic groups.  Thus, they can move toward the development of a common third identity while 
not threatening the existence of the primary identity.
Conclusion: The Mysterious Absence of Bulgarian Turkish Nationalism
A sovereign state-building strategy in Bosnia was probably doomed to fail.
110  The 
genocidal violence in Bosnia was the result of a multitude of factors but at their root these factors 
produced a dehumanizing stereotypical image of the adversary.  This stereotype associated with 
intense affect which emerged in the course of the escalating conflict to produce policies which 
aimed in some conflict zones to eliminate every man, woman and child of the despised other.
111  
The vast refugee and internally displaced person flows then destabilized local areas which had 
managed to maintain intercommunal cooperation to avoid fighting.
112  Today in the Sandzak, a 
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replay of this tragedy is unlikely as long as the political status quo remains regarding relations 
between Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international community, and Serbia. 
The overview in this paper implies that the perceptual environment characterizing 
identity of self and other in Bulgaria is also one which has the potential for genocide.  Perceived 
cultural differences and distances, together with a historical memory (regardless of how 
accurate) of mutual, near genocidal attacks and imperial oppression, is such that the stereotypical 
components for intense communal spiral conflict are present.  As to why post-1989 Bulgaria has 
not been more like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alexander Kolev finds that a critical part of the answer 
lies in the ideological commitment of the anti-Communist opposition against anti-minority 
nationalism.  This rejection of exploitation of the anti-Turkish “card” evidently derives from the 
Communist authorities massive (and repeated) and brutal effort to exploit this same card, most 
recently in the 1980s.  The economic depression into which Bulgaria fell in the late 1980s 
supposedly helped delegitimize these Communist elites together with their public policies.  The 
fact that the renamed “Bulgarian Socialist Party” actually won the first free elections in Bulgaria 
in 1990 to control parliament, while local BSP leaders in some parts of Bulgaria were leading 
demonstrations against reversing the forced name-change, belies this inference.  Clearly, 
rejection of traditional, anti-Turkish/Muslim stereotypical appeals by the opposition was 
important, but something even more significant must have been playing a role.  This element lies 
apparently in Turkey, rather than in Bulgaria; Turkey does not act “nationalistically” in its 
foreign relations with regard to Turkish and Muslim minorities abroad, i.e. irredentism appears 
consistently not to be a significant Turkish foreign policy motivation.
113  It apparently was an 
important motivation in Milosievic’s Yugoslavia until 1993.  At that time, he decided to support 
the Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina as a consequence of the increasing economic 
damage to Serbia as a result of international economic sanctions.
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As noted above, the post-1989 Bulgarian authorities have not granted regional autonomy 
to regions in Bulgaria with a heavy Turkish population concentration despite Council of Europe 
suggestions that Bulgaria do so.  Cottam and Cottam suggest that minorities with a significant 
degree of capability to consider secession as an option from a state in which they are clearly 
marginalized would tend to require a “shared sovereignty” strategy for integrating the minority 
and promoting resolution of the ethnic conflict.  Ultimately, the synthesis of societal trends 
would produce through this synthesis a new cultural core community for the state, and the state 
would not have an ethnic basis in the current majority.  In Bulgaria, municipal governments are 
subject to election, but the central government insists on appointing regional governors despite 
recommendations from the Council of Europe to allow their direct election as well.  
The Bulgarian authorities have instead integrated the main representative of the Turkish 
minority into the government through its nearly omnipresent balancing role in forming majority 
coalition governments.  Rather, then, Bulgaria appears to be following more the “utilitarian 
                                                                                                                                                            
came about after 1) massive use of military power, 2) a massive military deployment, and 3) a 
long, disastrous conflict with many dead and displaced persons.
113 Cottam and Cottam provide a list of “nationalistic” political behavior patterns which nation 
states and core communities aspiring towards nation statehood are comparatively more likely to 
manifest, including a preoccupation with the “ingathering” of diaspora communities [Martha L. 
and Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism and Politics: The Political Behavior of Nation States
(Lynne Reinner, 2001), p. 13].
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integration” approach which Cottam and Cottam suggest is likely for marginalized minorities 
which cannot seriously contemplate the option of secession.
115  In this approach, genuinely 
representative leaders of the systematically underprivileged minority publicly acquire a 
surprising and unexpected degree of evident influence in the polity, in the view of the minority.  
Ahmed Dogan of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms certainly seems to have met this 
imperative.  The cultural basis for the authority norms of the political community will evolve as 
in the shared sovereignty strategy, and integration of the minority in an evolving cultural 
community will proceed.  As long as neighboring Turkey continues to act in a surprisingly 
passive role in comparison with other states which have proclaimed their role as patron state 
protector of their diaspora, the utilitarian integration strategy may be most appropriate.  This 
historic passivity undercuts Bulgarian Turkish aspirations to demand formal constitutional 
modifications to the Bulgarian constitution to guarantee their self-expression through regional 
autonomy arrangements.  The Bulgarian Turkish and Muslim community cannot look to Turkey 
as likely to support them in irredentist aspirations; it has not done so since the start of the process 
of Bulgaria’s own secession from the Ottoman Empire in 1878.  Today, Turkey’s role in the 
protection of the Bulgarian Turks extends to giving Bulgarian Turks Turkish citizenship, which 
they can hold alongside Bulgarian citizenship.  Bulgaria’s agreement to allow dual citizenship 
might be understood as a form of shared sovereignty over Bulgaria’s Turks between Bulgaria 
and Turkey, but it is a minimalist approach relative to the options of regional self-government 
through state federation.
Ironically, then, the solution to the mystery of the successful so-called “Bulgarian ethnic 
model” which appears frequently in the Bulgarian press must include a focus, then, on Turkey 
and the nature of the Turkish state.  Claiming that ideological predilections explain also the 
absence of irredentist tendencies in Turkish foreign policy is also insufficient.  Arguably, the 
Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus might be a manifestation of such irredentism but Turkey has 
never annexed this section of the island.  Turkey also appears willing to withdraw in return for 
guarantees for the protection of the ethnic Turkish community there and entry into the European 
Union.  In other words, Turkey’s foreign policy motivations appear not to have at a primary level 
the pan-Turanist expansion of the influence of the Turkish political community.  To the extent 
that these ideological predispositions exist, the source which imbues them in the Turkish elite 
must be a structural one.    
Firstly, Turkey is not a nation state.  It has a Turkish core community but a large 
percentage of the population is not Turkish, but Kurdish.  The Turkish authorities have struggled 
violently with the nature of the identity of the state most recently in combating the Kurdish 
separatist movement.  Secondly, the Turkish secular ruling elite looks to Euro-Atlantic 
integration to address Turkey’s foreign and domestic challenges.  Kemal Ataturk’s 
“Westernization” policy has been critical in the formation of a modern Turkish identity, 
requiring peaceful relations with European and US status quo great powers.
116  Consequently, 
arguably the Turks themselves are relatively lacking in a consensus on the essential nature of 
“Turkishness” today.  Issues of ethnicity (Turkish, Kurd) and sectarianism (Kemalist secularism 
versus political Islamism, Sunni versus Alawi,) pervade the political community of Turkey.  
Absence of a relative elite and mass pubic consensus on the essential component community 
elements of Turkish national cultural identity would be a strong factor mitigating predispositions 
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towards Turkish irredentism, not to mention Turkish national grandeur, as a primary foreign 
policy motivation.  Thirdly, like with Russia, a community consensus on the historic borders of 
“Turkey” are relatively lacking.  
Cottam and Cottam seek to explore why the disintegration of the Soviet Union was 
remarkably less violent with regard to the Russian minorities left in the newly independent states 
in comparison to the role of Serbian irredentism in the violent break-up of Yugoslavia.
117   
Cottam and Cottam conclude that much less of a consensus existed in Russia regarding 
historically to where the historic boundaries of Russia extended.  The most militant Russian 
nationalists would equate the boundaries of the Russian empire and later of the Soviet Union 
with the boundaries of the Russian state.  Others in the Russian political ruling elite would be 
hard pressed to accept that Samarkhand and Baku, for example, were originally Russian cities, 
and the Turkic and Aryan Muslim populations in Central Asia are interlopers who settled on 
historic Russian lands.  In the Balkans, however, Serb, Bosnian, Bulgaria, Greek, Macedonian 
and Croat nationalists all make historic overlapping territorial claims on the territory of the 
former Yugoslavia.  They derive from their respective collective consensus “golden age” 
memories of the boundaries of their respective medieval states.  The mantra that Kosovo is the 
“cradle” of Serb civilization is one which most Serbs would willingly accept.  In contrast, a 
sovereignty claim to Kievan Rus in today’s Ukraine because it is critical to Russian self-identity 
is not likely to generate as much affective consensus among the Russian public.
A hypothesis requiring further investigation is that Turkish nationalism is struggling with 
the same weaknesses in explaining why Turkey has not acted more assertively with regard to the 
Turkish diaspora.  The typical Turkish Kemalist nationalist would not likely accept that the 
natural, historic boundaries of Turkey correspond with the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire.  
The Ottoman Muslim expansion into the Balkans was clearly an expansion at the expense of 
other, Christian empires and states, and justified as such.   
If true, then ironically, an explanation for the success of the post-1989 “Bulgarian ethnic 
model” has to have a critical element focusing on Turkey and its own internal communal 
political psychological composition, as much as it must examine Bulgaria.  The ambiguous 
legacy of empire requires it.  Such a study, moreover, would give useful insight into predicting 
what political behavior patterns Turkish foreign and domestic policy would display as a member 
of the European Union.
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